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According to the Burgher of Paris, everyone in the processions at Paris in 1412 ‘cried a lot and shed 
a lot of tears.’1 The chronicler Georges Chastellain reported that a criminal being put to death 
talked to the on-lookers, ‘and he so touched their hearts that all burst into tears of compassion.’2 
During the funeral procession of Charles VII, says the Journal de Jean de Roye, the courtiers, were 
‘all dressed in the deepest mourning, which made them very pitiful to see, and because of the great 
sorrow and grief that they showed for the death of their master, tears were shed and lamentations 
made by all in that city.’3 Nor were there just floods of tears in these sorts of accounts: princes, in 
Chastellain’s view, were ‘subject to many passions, such as hatred and envy, . . . and their hearts 
are veritable dwelling places of such things.’ 4 And thus Philip the Good, according to Chastellain, 
‘would devote himself to avenging the dead in the most violent and deadly rage (aigreur).’5 
These and similar passages helped Johan Huizinga illustrate a major thesis of his 1919 publication 
Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen: that, for all its decadence, the late Middle Ages nevertheless 
continued to represent the innocent childhood of modern man.6 That meant, in effect, that the 
early and high Middle Ages signified man’s infancy. Hence Huizinga’s repeated use of the word 
‘still’ (‘nog’ in Dutch) for the fifteenth century, as in his assertion that ‘a conflict between royal 
princes over a chessboard was still as plausible as a motive in the fifteenth century as in 
Carolingian romance’; or ‘during the fifteenth century the immediate emotional affect is still 
directly expressed in ways that frequently break through the veneer of utility and calculation’; or 
even ‘life still wore the color of fairy tales.’7 And, putting the same point another way: ‘Politics are 
not yet completely in the grip of bureaucracy and protocol.’8 The Middle Ages was the period of 
‘unmediated’ emotion, Huizinga said, of pure, ‘flaming passion.’9 ‘Modern man’, he concluded, 
‘has, as a rule, no idea of the unrestrained extravagance and inflammability of the medieval 
heart.’10 
Lucien Febvre, co-founder with Marc Bloch of the Annales school of history, much appreciated 
Huizinga’s work. In a famous article on the emotions in history published in 1942, Febvre saw 
himself (and has since been seen by many others) as inaugurating emotions history.11 He criticized 
Huizinga in his article, but only for neglecting to say that the Middle Ages was not alone in its 
raging passions: such things could emerge at any time, as Febvre was himself witnessing in the 
Europe of his own day.12 For his own part, Marc Bloch, so willing to question most old paradigms 
about the Middle Ages, had no qualms about adopting Huizinga’s generalizations about medieval 
emotions. Like Huizinga, he called the Middle Ages ‘a civilization in which moral or social 
convention did not yet require well-bred people to repress their tears and their raptures.’13 Not yet; 
but eventually. 
It was only a very intrepid historian who could withstand the juggernaut that this view 
represented, especially as it was bolstered by Freudian ideas about civilization and its discontents, 
Elias’s notion of a ‘civilizing process’, Max Weber’s theory of progressive bureaucratization and 
routinization, and anthropological notions of primitive society. In fact, Huizinga’s picture 
continues to dominate modern historiography today, even that done by medievalists.14 
There are two major exceptions to this generalization about medievalists. First, there are those 
who take seriously the development of love as a theme in both religious experience and relations 
between the sexes. Already in 1957 Jean Leclercq’s L’Amour des lettres et le désir de Dieu wrested 
in its very title at least 
two emotions – love and desire – from mankind’s childhood, elevating them to the level of sublime 
self-expression.15 His study represents one group rowing against the current.16 
The other is a strand of legal history that views medieval emotions not as childish or impulsive but 
rather as functional and communicative. The grandfather of such studies was J.E.A. Jolliffe, who 
as early as 1955 realized that royal anger had effective political meaning and was not simply the 
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effusion of an Angevin out of control.17 If Jolliffe had bothered with Huizinga’s sources, he would 
have said that tearful people and vengeful princes served the interests of the state.18 
With Huizinga’s paradigm the history of emotions can begin only after the Middle Ages, when 
passions cease to be natural forces and come under the control of social and moral constraints. 
With Leclercq and Jolliffe – and their many successors – medieval emotions become religious, 
interpersonal, or political instruments, and thus open to historical inquiry. If in the Angevin 
period, for example, ira and malevolentia filled the gaps where customary remedies were 
lacking,19 we may ask when and how royal emotional displays as well as their reception by others 
were modified in the face of new institutions. Gerd Althoff and Paul Hyams have answered this in 
very different ways, noting the impact on royal anger of theologians acting as ecclesiastical 
advisors.20 We may even go beyond Jolliffe, to ask how emotions of ordinary men and women may 
have shaped and reacted to new political institutions. Hyams and Daniel Smail are exploring this 
question in relation to legal systems, proposing that emotions such as rancor and hatred lie behind 
such developments as English common law and civil litigation in late medieval Marseille.21 
But even these two brave traditions of love and anger privilege the High and Late Middle Ages. 
Leclercq was thinking of the Cistercians when he spoke of the role of love in monastic life, and 
Jolliffe was thinking of Henry II. On the whole, their successors have not challenged this 
periodization, however much they have deepened our sense of the emotional life of the period after 
1100.22 
But what of the early Middle Ages? There are good theoretical reasons for them to be equally 
liberated from the childhood paradigm. In the last two decades cognitivist and social-
constructionist psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists have jettisoned the view that 
emotions are forces pressing for release and thus undergoing progressive suppression as one 
moves from childhood to maturity. The cognitivists see emotions as having an assessment role, 
rather like judgments: emotions come into play when people’s goals are changed, forwarded, or 
thwarted, their honor or well-being ratified, enhanced, or impugned.23 In this view, emotions make 
us ready for action, ready (that is) to change goals, strategies, and behaviors. The social 
constructionists too have much to say here, for it follows as a matter of common sense – and of 
historical sensibility as well – that goals and notions of well-being, as well as the actions that are 
appropriate in response to challenges, are all largely socially constructed. Moreover, the social 
constructionist view helps explain why certain modes of emotional expression are encouraged and 
valued while others are vilified or mocked. The social construction of emotions declares that 
emotions cannot exist apart from the society that shapes them.24 Looking at the Paris processions 
of 1412 through the lenses of the cognitivist/constructionists allows us to say, at the very least, that 
displays of tears at certain kinds of functions were highly valued at this time, even if in 1919, when 
Huizinga was writing, they seemed childish and silly. 
But when the men and women of fifteenth-century Paris went home from their parade, did they 
normally value (and display) weeping behavior? Perhaps not. Different communities and contexts 
may foster different emotional norms. Piroska Nagy’s study of the gift of tears shows that in the 
twelfth century, while some monastic communities fostered the gift, others favored dry eyes.25 The 
difference went beyond tears, to the very conception of the salvific process. (That is as it should be, 
since emotions are so closely tied to goals.) But the fact that weeping could have a number of 
different meanings and values in the same society suggests that, when it comes to emotion, social 
constructionism may be too global. I propose the idea of emotional communities to root social 
constructionism in micro-societies. People function, even during one lifetime, within different 
social groups that have their own modes of interaction, forms of emotional expression, and 
valuations of particular emotions and emotional gestures. These groups may be as amorphous as 
an elite in which many members do not know one another personally yet share certain 
assumptions, goals, and values that have – perforce – emotional components. Or such groups may 
be as tight as a family around the dinner table. Or they may be somewhere between these two end 
points of a continuum of personal relations. And, though it is not relevant to this article per se, it is 
nevertheless important to mention that people may live in more than one such community nearly 
simultaneously; one can ordinarily move without pain, and even with pleasure, from community to 
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community, just as one listens with enjoyment to various kinds of music. 
Consider once again Huizinga’s use of the word ‘still.’ Where does the infancy of man’s history 
begin? Although the earliest period that Huizinga invokes is the Carolingian, it is quite likely that 
he, like his contemporary Danish medievalist Vilhelm Grönbech, assumed the Middle Ages to have 
begun when the Germanic tribes conquered the former Roman Empire.26 The notion of ‘pure 
passion’ was bound up with the nineteenth and early twentieth century’s ambivalent romance with 
the Germanic barbarians, ‘uninhibited’, as Norbert Elias put it, in the ‘release of the affects in 
battle.’27 There is real frisson here, with the barbarian as the ‘id’, and the superego only slowly 
taking shape. Thus the medieval knight was said to be not quite as uninhibited as the Germanic 
warrior, but his passions were nevertheless (in Elias’s words) ‘open and uninh[i]bited enough.’28 
Even Jolliffe, as we have seen, had to wait until the Angevins came on the scene to find uses in 
royal anger. Yet the notion of emotional communities, founded as it is on 
cognitivist/constructionist psychology, suggests that every period must have its own (and various) 
ways of valorizing, restraining, and expressing emotions. Contrary to Huizinga, Bloch, and Elias, 
there can be no infancy of human emotional life, except in infants. What, then, can we say about 
the emotional communities of the Early Middle Ages? That is the large question that I wish to 
begin to explore in the rest of this article. As there is no space here to cover all the contours of 
these communities, I shall focus on just three communities and on two telling issues for all of 
them: parent-child relations and the personality of the devil. Even so, it will be something of a 
whirlwind tour. 
A preliminary word about methodology. I will first discuss the emotional community of Bishop 
Gregory of Tours and Pope Gregory the Great, and for that inquiry I will make use of the corpus of 
writings each left behind. Then, I shall look at two emotional communities in seventh-century 
Francia, where the evidence will come from materials written by many different members of those 
communities. Written texts are thus key in both instances, and perhaps the reader will demur, 
doubting that texts can tell us much about real emotions. Let me quickly defuse this objection. 
First, written texts are more or less all we historians have for any of our studies. This is the point of 
the linguistic turn, but it has not stopped us from writing about politics, society, or culture. 
Second, emotions are always mediated by words and gestures; we can never have immediate 
access to them. Psychiatrists and lovers must face this as surely as historians. 
There is the further problem that many of our sources are full of commonplaces. But this is no 
more problematic than the fact that most – some would say all – emotional expressions are 
scripted. We normally have a choice of scripts, and writers normally have a choice of topoi. Indeed, 
I suggest that commonplaces should be considered the written equivalent of overlearned habits, 
their very familiarity linking them to emotions, which, in the words of psychologists Isen and 
Diamond, ‘take no effort to be felt and are irresistible.’29 Finally, emotions are so closely linked to 
words that the historian William Reddy has coined the word ‘emotives’ to describe them. Much 
like ‘performatives’ which change the status of things (e.g. ‘I now pronounce you man and wife’), 
emotions, which in Reddy’s view must be stated to be known, transform not only the external 
world but also the interior one of the utterer.30 ‘I love you’ realigns a relationship, altering the 
beloved and the lover at the same time. Since at any given time the emotives that people express 
are fairly limited by social norms, the performative effect of emotives means that they tend to 
reinforce internal emotional configurations. I may be trying out ‘I love you,’ but if I repeat it often 
enough – if I invest in it – I may come to believe it myself, allowing it to crowd out all other 
possible emotives. 
 
The two Gregories 
With these preliminary remarks in mind, let us turn to the two Gregories, avatars of the late sixth 
century. The one we call ‘the Great’ was pope at Rome in 590–604; the bishop of Tours presided 
over his see 573–c. 594. They did not know one another, although Gregory of Tours knew about 
and even quoted Pope Gregory. It would be possible to take each of them separately, as members 
of somewhat different emotional communities. But the similarities are even more striking, no 
doubt because they both belonged to the clerical elite of the period, which shared common 
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outlooks, goals, and emotional expectations.31 Both men were moderately comfortable revealing 
emotions and talking about them in action. While they deplored many emotions, neither was rigid 
in his condemnation. Thus Gregory the Great included tristitia (sadness, melancholy) in his list of 
the seven principal vices,32 but in fact tristitia also figured in his writings as a saving grace.33 In the 
rich Latin vocabulary available to them, both authors found a host of words to suggest many 
nuances of emotional expression and behavior. Anger, for example, was indicated by words 
covering a spectrum of intensities, from the fairly benign commotus to the furious furor, with ira, 
iracundia, tumens felle, and livor in between.34 For both men, too, there was an emotional self: 
Gregory the Great revealed his when talking about life in his monastery on the Caelian hill; 
Gregory of Tours tended to express his own feelings when recalling his childhood or reporting on 
his family. For both, finally, emotions had communicative functions and, beyond that, 
transformative effects, bearing out Reddy’s emotives. 
Let us begin with the bishop of Tours. In his Vita Patrum a baby was very sick, and his mother 
kept weeping (flebat) because he might die yet had not been baptized. Finally, taking counsel, she 
took the infant to the tomb of Illidius, not incidentally the great-grandfather of her child and 
Gregory’s uncle. She lay the boy, who was barely breathing, on the ground and ‘kept watch with 
vigils and prayers in front of the tomb of the bishop.’ Just before dawn the child grew strong and, 
in Gregory’s words, making manifest the joys in his heart (gaudia cordis) by a preceding laugh 
(risu praecedente), with his mouth opened by divine inspiration, he said, ‘Come here.’ And she, 
who had never until now heard the voice of her son. came to [him] trembling with joy (cum 
tremore et gaudio), and said, in wonder (stupens), ‘What do you want, my most sweet son?’35 
The child asked for a cup of water. But the mother first poured out her thanks to Illidius and vowed 
her son to him. After the child received the water, he drank, became strong, and thereafter ceased 
to speak until the normal time that children learn to talk. 
No doubt this tale is reminiscent of countless miracle stories. And yet it has rarely been noted that 
in such stories it is emotions – both stated and implied –that drive the narrative and give it 
meaning. The whole story would be pointless if mothers did not love their children. This is the 
underlying emotion, so obvious to Gregory that he simply assumes it from the start, and his 
readers along with him. If this mother’s love was aimed particularly at the salvation of her child 
(hence the emphasis on his unbaptized state), nevertheless his survival was also her goal. 
Mother love, parental love: these were key emotions for both Gregories. When a wave of dysentery 
hit Gaul, Gregory of Tours wrote: 
 
We lost our sweet children, so dear to us, whom we had cherished in our bosoms and carried 
in our arms. Serving them food with our own hands, we nourished them with very vigilant 
zeal (studio sagatiore). But, wiping away our tears, we say with blessed Job, ‘The Lord gave; 
the Lord hath taken away.’ (Job 1.21)36 
 
And Gregory the Great, rather less inclined to give in to such emotions, nevertheless recognized 
their power. One wave of the Justinianic Plague hit Rome in 590, and Gregory was painfully aware 
of its toll on the young. Turning to the men of his audience at the end of his homily on St. Felicity, 
given in the wake of this event, he upbraided them and himself for ‘mourning without consolation’ 
(sine consolatione lugemus) the children who were lost ‘by divine decree.’37 Yet in the same 
Homily Gregory assured his listeners that Felicity, who lost her seven sons to Roman persecutors, 
‘could not watch her sons dying without pain (sine dolore).’38 And in the same Homily he puzzled 
over the Gospel passage that had Christ talking to the people while rejecting the attention 
requested by his mother and kinsmen, who ‘stood outside.’ ‘Who is my mother, and who are my 
brothers?’ (Mt 12.46–50), Jesus is quoted as asking. Gregory explained that this familial 
repudiation was a pretense (in his words, Jesus was dissembling [dissimulat]), because this was 
not in fact Jesus’s mother: the Mary who ‘stood outside’ signified the Jews and their synagogue.39 
So when Gregory of Tours depicted a mother and child, he could count on his readers to fill in the 
emotional silences. In the miracle story with Illidius, the focus begins with the mother, then shifts 
to the child and his feelings. Here a kind of emotions theory is embedded in the text. The cured 
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child gives a laugh first, anticipating the joy of his heart (gaudia cordis risu praecedente 
patefaciens). Rather than the emotion preparing us for action, as modern theory would have it, 
Gregory here sees the gesture as preceding the internal joy. This may go some way in explaining 
why display seems so important a part of medieval emotional expression, for learned theory is not 
independent of lived experience.40 But the real miracle, the moment for which Gregory uses the 
word ‘divinitus’ (by divine intervention), is the child’s call to his mother. She is thereby 
emotionally trans -formed. We begin with a mother habitually weeping; we end with one 
‘trembling with joy’ and ‘in wonder.’ The episode concludes with a new take on mother love, as she 
does not immediately fulfill the child’s command but rather remains in situ, thanking Illidius and 
vowing her son to him. 
The story is very idealized and conforms to the emotional transformations that a churchman would 
want to see. But Gregory was right to think that emotions are connected to goals. Even if we may 
doubt that the episode ever happened – and certainly we know that Gregory cannot have known 
the emotions of the baby nor, probably, of the mother – Gregory’s account nevertheless tells us 
how he imagined such a moment and thus, at some level, how it would have been felt, at least by 
him, were he in the shoes of mother and baby.41 
That Gregory did want to tell his readers about the feelings involved in this miracle may have a 
good deal to do with the fact that it was peopled with his relatives. Many of his other miracle 
stories are dry and emotionless. Consider, for example, his account of two blind men from Bourges 
who come to St. Martin’s tomb. ‘A brightness like a flash burst over them [wrote Gregory] and they 
merited to see everything.’42 No doubt Gregory assumed his readers knew that people came to 
Martin’s tomb in both physical and mental pain and that, when they were cured, they were joyous. 
But he rarely saw the need to say so. Gregory’s emphasis on his own feelings may be part of what 
Ian Wood has called his ‘individuality.’ Gregory skewed his Histories to include the parts of Gaul 
significant to his family, and he extolled his family’s cults while excluding others. Yet for the most 
part he kept these family ties a secret, posing as a disinterested observer.43 Most of the emotional 
bits may be about him, even though he does not say so. For Wood this individuality means that 
Gregory of Tours may not be so representative of the sixth century as we historians would like to 
believe. But the same sort of thing may be said about Gregory the Great, whose most passionate 
passages have to do with himself and the monastery that he founded and lived in. 
Given their appreciation of emotions, at least when matters concerned them personally, it is 
significant that for both Gregories the devil – that being who is neither human nor godly – has 
feelings. For with the devil we have a virtual emotional tabula rasa, although the Bible does suggest 
certain associations that may be drawn upon or not. Often, to be sure, the devil just rages (saevit), 
which is not an emotion but rather a form of bestial ferocity.44 Nevertheless, at other times, he is a 
feeling being, possessed mainly by envy. In Gregory of Tours’ Vita Patrum the devil figures as the 
first emotional being of the collection, with three different words for envy to describe his feelings: 
his livor leads him to plague saints Romanus and Lipicinus with stones, his invidia drives them 
out of the desert, and even so he remains aemulus of their sanctity. But, as a poor woman informs 
the saints, the devil’s envy grows out of his ‘fear (metuit) that the human race (genus humanum) 
will rise, ennobled its by faith.’45 Thus the devil is not just envious but also afraid. 
In the Moralia of Gregory the Great, more dependent on biblical vocabulary, the devil is similarly 
inspired by envy (inuidendo) as well as anger (ira, as in Rev. 12.12: ‘the devil has come down to 
you in great wrath’), fury ( furor), and even joy (gaudet) when he carries off his booty.46 In turn the 
devil has an effect on the emotions of others: he teaches the good servant ‘how much to fear 
(timeret)’ and, in Gregory’s Pastoral Rule, he works to extinguish caritas.47 
 
Repudiating feeling: the court of Clothar II 
The importance of this feeling devil becomes clear when we realize that he disappears in a different 
emotional community, that connected with the court of Clothar II and his son Dagobert, kings of 
Neustria and Austrasia in the early seventh century.48 For this community we have a significant 
number of texts. Although many of them were written about sixth-century saints, they themselves 
date from the first half of the seventh century and must be analyzed in that context, which was 
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dominated by the events of 613–614. In 613 Clothar II wiped out all traces of the old regime by 
brutally dismembering its root, the matriarch Brunhild, and imposing a damnatio memoriae on 
her branches as well.49 As we shall see, the emotional community represented by members of 
Clothar’s court were wary of emotions, particularly those of mothers. This may have been the case 
not only because of the regime’s extreme vilification of Brunhild but also, it seems, because of 
Clothar’s own troubled paternity. A recent study by Ian Wood argues that Clothar was probably 
not the son of Chilperic I, king of the Merovingian realm based at Soissons, but rather an 
illegitimate child of Fredegund, Chilperic’s wife.50 No long-haired sacrality or blood line related 
him to the Merovingians. He wore the royal crown because of his mother. In what must have been 
a most impressive public event, she had affirmed publicly, with the support of oaths from three 
bishops and three hundred viri optimi, that Clothar was the son of Chilperic.51 No wonder he 
repudiated mothers – and their passions – in general. His position as head of both Neustria and 
Austrasia was thus based on pure power politics, which, in the context, meant largely his ability to 
create and retain the support the Frankish nobility. Clothar was amazingly successful, the first 
Merovingian to unite the two kingdoms under one man’s rule. His iron hand is, I think, reflected in 
the texts produced by courtiers or former courtiers under his and his son’s influence. This, in any 
event, is my hypothesis to account for the effusive mothers and dispassionate heros of the texts 
produced by men such as Desiderius of Vienne and Jonas of Bobbio.52 
Consider, for example, Jonas’s depiction of John of Réomé’s reaction to his mother’s wish to see 
him after many years’ separation. John had long ago left home to become first a hermit, then a 
monk, but now he was back in the vicinity of home. His mother, Jonas reports, delighting in his 
advent, hastened to him, rejoicing (ovans) to look upon his countenance. She came to where he 
was and applied to his assistants to allow her see her long-desired child (desideratam . . . prolem) 
with her own eyes. He declined, recalling the words of the Gospel, ‘He who does not leave father 
and mother is not worthy of me.’ (Mt 10.37) Yet he granted her a glimpse, walking past her 
(transsiens ante aeam) for a moment ‘to satisfy his mother’s desire ( desiderium) yet not weaken 
the vigor of his religion on account of her allurements (blandimenta).’ Then he had one of his 
assistants tell her that she would never see him again in the present life.53 
The scene is a virtual repeat of the famous set piece in Jonas’s Vita Columbani, where the saint’s 
mother tries to prevent him from leaving home. She is struck with pain (dolore) and begs him not 
to go. ‘Haven’t you heard,’ he shoots back, ‘He who loves his father and mother more than me is 
not worthy of me?’ She, wailing (eiulans) and prostrate on the ground, denies him permission to 
go; he, jumping over the threshold and his mother, admonishes her to be happy: she will never see 
him again in this life.54 
Is such an emotional configuration – a highly emotional mother, a tepid or even callous saint – 
simply a topos, part of a long-hallowed tradition of asceticism, rather than evidence of real 
emotion? Of course, we cannot deny that it is a topos. But when understood as an emotive as well, 
it may be seen to reflect real emotions – insofar as any words may do so – precisely because it 
repeats with evident conviction one sort of emotional stance. It is not as though seventh-century 
authors had no other possibilities. Even within the ascetic tradition, there were choices. We have 
already seen the two Gregories represent sons and mothers quite lovingly. In the sixth-century Life 
of Fulgentius of Ruspe, a confrontation between a saint and his mother is handled very differently 
than it is in the Vitae of John or Columbanus. Here the hero’s mother comes to his monastery 
wanting to wrest her child from the religious life altogether. But the bishop speaks to her ‘calmly’ ( 
aequanimiter) at the door, gently denying her request, while Fulgentius himself is depicted as 
suffering deeply, for he ‘had always loved’ ( semper amaverat) his mother.55 Early seventh-century 
writers knew at least some of this tenderer tradition, but they chose to ignore it. 
Given the premium on ‘cool’ saints in these materials, it is significant that the devil rarely appears 
in them, as if the straight-laced atmosphere of the Clotharian court had no use for so dangerous a 
being. Thus it is not surprising that when he does occasionally enter a story, he is depicted without 
emotions. Conversely, his main concern is to arouse passions in his victims. For example, feeling 
nothing himself (or at least nothing that the author sees the need to report), the devil tries to 
arouse the love (amores) of lascivious girls in Saint Columbanus.56 Later the old enemy is more 
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successful with Brunhild, whom he ‘excites by the sting of pride.’57 When Athala takes over the 
abbacy at Bobbio, the Italian monastery founded by Columbanus, the devil stirs up discordia, 
‘inciting the hearts of some of his subordinates against [the new abbot].’58 And so on.59 This is tepid 
stuff. 
 
The emotional late seventh century 
Contrast these cool sources with the passionate emotions of the last quarter of the seventh century. 
Now factional fighting tore at the fabric of the Merovingian polity. For this period it is difficult to 
point to links between people and texts, as most of the writings that we have are anonymous. Yet 
we can see in them common political assumptions: they represent the late seventh-century elite in 
Neustria and Burgundy, who, whatever side they may have been on, shared a common desire for 
royal access and privilege. Filled with the emotions that fuel discord, they were nevertheless 
unafraid to emphasize tenderer passions as well. We are in fact in an emotional world reminiscent 
of the chronicles that inspired Huizinga. Thus the monastic author of the Passio Leudegarii wrote 
that the ‘duces, along with their wives, ministers, and their whole familia, not to mention the 
vulgus populi, were so united in their love (amore) for [Leudegarius]’ that they were ready to lay 
down their lives for him.60 When the wall of an old house collapsed, apparently crushing a 
bystander, Saint Praejectus began to wail (cum eiulatibus) and, entering a nearby church, 
produced a shower of tears (lacrimaruim inbrem) as he prayed to God. The bystander was 
retrieved alive.61 When Saint Ouen, bishop of Rouen, came to the boundaries of his diocese after a 
trip to Rome, ‘the suburbani cives as well as the vulgi populus rolled out in throngs, exulting for 
joy and at the same time weeping.’ Even the king, queen, and nobles of the palace rejoiced 
(laetantes) and clapped their hands.62 
In these texts, the devil, however evil, at the same time seethes with feelings of every sort. He is 
often envious (invidus), as he was with the two Gregories.63 But he also has other emotions: he is 
terrified (conterritus) at the tomb of a saint,64 and when he sees monks preoccupied with virtue, he 
is capable of lamenting (lugeat) and even of feeling the ‘greatest grief’ (maximam merorem).65 
Endowing the devil with emotional breadth makes him another player in the politics of the period, 
a real person whose actions and feelings stir up others. 
Curiously – at least at first glance – parents are relegated to the side-lines in these late seventh-
century sources, becoming nearly invisible. By contrast with the court of Clothar, which excoriated 
mothers and their importunate demands, the factions of the late seventh century hardly noticed 
mothers at all. The Vita of Queen Balthild begins with her arrival from England to Gaul;66 Saint 
Leudegarius is said to be nobly born ‘by earthly generosity,’ his parents passed over in silence;67 
Saint Ouen has a mother and father, but they are simply named in at the start and forgotten 
thereafter.68 Only Praejectus’s mother gets a bit part in his story: in a trance she sees her unborn 
child come out of her side, and, ‘struck by the vision and trembling, she began to wail (ullare) all 
about, wanting to know what such things might mean for her.’69 To a large degree, then, biological 
mothers have become unimportant in these texts. But they are replaced by loving father and 
mother figures. Thus the author of the Passio Praejecti remarks dryly that the baby saint ‘was 
born, cried in his cradle, and was fed with milk’ –though no parent seems to be on the scene – but 
after he was given to archdeacon Genesius, some real fathering took place: ‘having received him 
with paternal affection, Genesius brought him up with all care and educated him.’70 Queen Balthild 
was the biological mother of three sons, but her biographer becomes effusive about her mothering 
only when she enters the monastery at Chelles: ‘She loved the sisters with the most pious affection 
(affectu diligebat) as if they were her own daughters.’71 The evidence suggests an elite used more to 
foster-parentage than home upbringing. 
I began this article with the Burgher of Paris’s crowd in tears; I end – or nearly – with an equally 
emotional throng around Saint Ouen. Was Huizinga right to see such things as the symptoms of a 
childlike mentality? Clearly not. Jolliffe and Co. are much closer to the mark to understand them 
as political gestures. But they are not gestures that would work at every point in the early Middle 
Ages. In the first half of the seventh century, for example, the court of Clothar II would have 
disdained them; they would have seemed (as they do to some of us today) ‘over the top.’ It is 
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useful, then, to recall that emotions are assessments of weal or woe, and thus tied not only to ways 
of communicating but also to the whole set of goals that an individual, a group, a community sets 
for itself and considers to be in its interests. We have seen three quite different emotional 
communities in the space of about a century: the first appreciated emotions in moderation; the 
second was wary in the extreme of feelings, especially those of mothers; and, the third reveled in 
feelings of every sort. There must have been other communities during that same period, some of 
which may be ferreted out by medievalists and others of which may never be recovered. But at 
least we can say, turning Marc Bloch’s phrase on its head, that the Middle Ages was ‘a civilization 
in which moral or social conventions (sometimes) required well-bred people to express themselves 
in tears and raptures.’ 
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